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Visual selective attention is the brain function that modulates ongoing processing of retinal input in order
for selected representations to gain privileged access to perceptual awareness and guide behavior.
Enhanced analysis of currently relevant or otherwise salient information is often accompanied by sup-
pressed processing of the less relevant or salient input. Recent ﬁndings indicate that rewards exert a pow-
erful inﬂuence on the deployment of visual selective attention. Such inﬂuence takes different forms
depending on the speciﬁc protocol adopted in the given study. In some cases, the prospect of earning
a larger reward in relation to a speciﬁc stimulus or location biases attention accordingly in order to max-
imize overall gain. This is mediated by an effect of reward acting as a type of incentive motivation for the
strategic control of attention. In contrast, reward delivery can directly alter the processing of speciﬁc
stimuli by increasing their attentional priority, and this can be measured even when rewards are no
longer involved, reﬂecting a form of reward-mediated attentional learning. As a further development,
recent work demonstrates that rewards can affect attentional learning in dissociable ways depending
on whether rewards are perceived as feedback on performance or instead are registered as random-like
events occurring during task performance. Speciﬁcally, it appears that visual selective attention is shaped
by two distinct reward-related learning mechanisms: one requiring active monitoring of performance
and outcome, and a second one detecting the sheer association between objects in the environment
(whether attended or ignored) and the more-or-less rewarding events that accompany them. Overall this
emerging literature demonstrates unequivocally that rewards ‘‘teach’’ visual selective attention so that
processing resources will be allocated to objects, features and locations which are likely to optimize
the organism’s interaction with the surrounding environment and maximize positive outcome.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Visual selective attention and its adaptability
Efﬁcient goal-directed behavior is crucially mediated by visual
selective attention. We are constantly exposed to a bombardment
of sensory input, including from the retina; however, processing
resources are inherently limited, and therefore only a small part
of the incoming information can reach perceptual awareness and
play a role in guiding behavior. All the available stimuli in a given
context compete with one another to gain access to further pro-
cessing, and visual selective attention is instantiated when the
competition is resolved in favor of one or a few items of informa-
tion that are deemed more relevant or are otherwise conspicuous
(e.g., Chelazzi et al., 2011; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Reynolds
& Chelazzi, 2004). Through a twofold mechanism, visual selective
attention aids goal-directed behavior by boosting the representa-
tion of stimuli that are salient or otherwise relevant given thell rights reserved.
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lazzi).current context and the goals of the individual, and by weakening
the representation of the less relevant and potentially distracting
items, whose processing may harm the execution of the intended
behavior (e.g., Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Desimone &
Duncan, 1995; Egeth & Yantis, 1997; Pashler, 1998; Reynolds &
Chelazzi, 2004). The probability for different visual objects to be
selected by attentional mechanisms may depend on properties
that are perceptual in nature (in bottom-up, Theeuwes, 1992;
Yantis & Jonides, 1984), such as their luminance or color contrast,
or their sudden appearance, but also on strategic settings, for
instance when an observer is searching for a speciﬁc feature or ob-
ject in a cluttered display (Chelazzi, 1999; Egeth & Yantis, 1997;
Wolfe, 1994). Moreover, selection may depend on the signiﬁcance
that certain objects have gained over time through experience, sug-
gesting that visual selective attention and memory mechanisms
work in close functional synergy (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes,
2012; Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Desimone, 1996;
Kristjánsson, 2006; Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010; Logan, 2002).
This view of visual selective attention is supported by a vast lit-
erature showing that its deployment is ﬂexibly adapted depending
on the situation, with the result of increasing ﬁtness to the
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prisingly, then, attentional selection mechanisms are particularly
sensitive to the regularities offered by the situation, showing typ-
ical learning effects. These functional adjustments may occur on a
trial-by-trial basis (in the short term), indicating that the setting of
attentional priority is affected by a running evaluation of the
events that immediately precede each attentional episode, as well
as in the long term, indicating that prolonged experience with spe-
ciﬁc stimuli, contexts and tasks may give rise to enduring selection
biases. For instance, on-line adjustments of attentional selection
have been well documented in pop-out visual search tasks and
more demanding, conjunction search tasks. Here the stability of
target and distracters deﬁning features across consecutive trials
leads to marked improvements in search performance, even when
the repeated features are not critical for the task at hand (Maljkovic
& Nakayama, 1994, 1996, 2000; see Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes,
2012; Kristjánsson, 2006; Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010, for re-
views). Analogous priming mechanisms have been shown to affect
orienting of transient, cue-driven attention, strengthening the no-
tion that reﬂexive attention is not impermeable to the inﬂuence of
memory (Kristjánsson, Mackeben, & Nakayama, 2001; Kristjánsson
& Nakayama, 2003).
Similar rapid adjustments can be speciﬁcally found in relation
to the attentional processing of distracting items. For instance,
when a stimulus that has been shown as a distracter in the imme-
diately preceding trial (and was therefore ignored) is then dis-
played as the target in the current trial and needs to be selected
and processed, responses are slower and less accurate, giving rise
to the negative priming effect (e.g., Tipper, 1985, 2001).
To account for the above ﬁndings, in particular the observation
that inter-trial priming effects can aid the rapid orienting of atten-
tion to task-relevant and task-irrelevant items, the proposal has
been made that attentional deployment is constantly supported
by an implicit, primitive memory system (Kristjánsson, 2006;
Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010; Kristjánsson & Nakayama, 2003).
The fundamental role of the system would be to allow an individ-
ual to readily select information in the environment that has been
perceived and attended in the recent past, capitalizing on the fact
that the world around us rarely undergoes instantaneous changes.
Key properties of this mechanism would be that it mainly operates
at the level of individual stimulus features, it intervenes automat-
ically, and it entirely escapes voluntary control. Moreover, increas-
ing understanding of its neural underpinnings indicates that such
memory system operates at multiple processing levels of the per-
ceptual hierarchy, including nodes along the extrastriate cortical
visual pathways, and brain regions in parietal and frontal cortex
that are traditionally assumed to play a key role in attentional con-
trol (Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010).
Fine tuning of attention also occurs in the long term, showing
that prolonged practice with given stimuli and contexts can alter
attentional priorities for considerable lapses of time. In visual
search paradigms such lasting effects have been observed both in
relation to the selection of visual targets and to the suppression
of distracters, in all cases leading to a more efﬁcient processing
of stimuli that have been repeatedly subject to attentional treat-
ment. Long term beneﬁts on selection have been found for items
that were repeatedly used as targets for a number of trials
(Kyllingsbæk, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2001; Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977; Sireteanu & Rettenbach, 2000), for targets bearing features
that, although non task-relevant, were frequently associated to tar-
get items (Tseng, Gobell, & Sperling, 2004), for targets consistently
shown in speciﬁc spatial positions within the display (e.g., Ciara-
mitaro, Cameron, & Glimcher, 2001; Geng & Behrmann, 2002; Hoff-
man & Kunde, 1999; Miller, 1988), and for targets consistently
displayed together with speciﬁc distracters or arranged according
to repeatedly used target-distracter spatial conﬁgurations (Chun,2000; Chun & Jiang, 1998, 1999; Conci & Müller, 2012; Jiang &
Chun, 2001). The latter effect, known as ‘‘contextual cueing’’, has
been obtained also for targets embedded within naturalistic
scenes, supporting the notion that the underlying mechanisms
are likely to play a crucial role in guiding our attention to relevant
objects within complex, natural environments (Becker & Rasmus-
sen, 2008; Brockmole & Henderson, 2006; Stokes et al., 2012; Sum-
merﬁeld et al., 2006; Torralba et al., 2006). Moreover, if certain
stimuli are used extensively as targets in visual search tasks, large
interference effects are found when the same items are subse-
quently displayed in the role of distracters (Shiffrin & Schneider,
1977). This effect has been explained assuming that the repetitive
search for a given item will increase its attentional priority, render-
ing it gradually more perceptually salient over consecutive trials.
Consequently, when these objects with high priority are available
among other stimuli, they will automatically attract attentional re-
sources even when their selection is not required or beneﬁcial
(Kyllingsbæk, Schneider, & Bundesen, 2001).
Recent work has further demonstrated that the efﬁciency of
attentional deployment to task-relevant information can be specif-
ically aided by enhanced ability to ﬁlter-out distracting informa-
tion as a result of extended practice (Dixon et al., 2009; Gál
et al., 2009; Kelley & Yantis, 2009; Vidnyánszky & Sohn, 2005).
For example, in one elegant study it was found that prolonged
ignoring of a task-irrelevant and potentially interfering visual mo-
tion stimulus led to elevated thresholds for that stimulus, in the
long run and this was paralleled by attenuated fMRI responses
for the same stimulus in a number of cortical visual areas, includ-
ing MT+ (Gál et al., 2009).
A special case of long term memory inﬂuence on attention is gi-
ven by semantic associations, or the associations at the conceptual
level between a sought target and any visual item displayed within
a multi-element array (Moores, Laiti, & Chelazzi, 2003). It has been
demonstrated that, in the context of a visual search task, objects
associated to the target are both recalled more readily and chosen
more often in a forced-choice recency judgment procedure. More-
over, under appropriate conditions, the presence of an associated
object renders search slower and less accurate, owing to its ability
to summon attention automatically. Finally, objects associated to
the sought target tend to attract gaze more potently than unrelated
items. Overall it appears that objects semantically associated to the
object of search have privileged access to working memory, per-
ceptual awareness and decision mechanisms (Moores, Laiti, &
Chelazzi, 2003; see also Belke et al., 2008; Telling et al., 2010).
Measures of neural activity with a variety of methods, both in
humans and animals, are consistent with some of the above behav-
ioral reports (e.g., see Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010; for review).
Just to cite an example, recordings of single unit activity from
the inferotemporal cortex of the macaque suggest that the en-
hanced behavioral relevance of frequently attended stimuli, as well
as the reduced relevance of consistently ignored stimuli, is directly
linked to robust changes in their representation at the neural level.
In one study it was found that, following extensive training, neuro-
nal responses are increased for items repeatedly used as targets,
while they are progressively reduced for those repeatedly
displayed as distracters to be ignored (Jagadeesh et al., 2001).
Fully compatible observations have been obtained by recording
activity in the macaque frontal eye ﬁeld within the context of
visual search tasks (Bichot & Schall, 1999; Bichot, Schall, &
Thompson, 1996).
As the above literature indicates, visual selective attention
mechanisms are shaped and reﬁned through short- and long-term
learning and this property is likely crucial for allowing an efﬁcient
guidance of behavior. In fact, all the above adjustments share the
common property of adaptively meeting speciﬁc environmental
regularities and contingencies.
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selective attention is that of providing behavioral planning pro-
cesses with the most efﬁcient and relevant representation of the
outer world (see e.g., Gottlieb, 2012, for an interesting discussion
on this general point). Access to the limited central processing re-
sources must be granted to the objects that have the highest prior-
ity, given the current behavioral goals, and the knowledge
accumulated over the past in similar contexts (including through
evolution). Therefore, what has to be taken into account during
attentional selection cannot be a simple memory of the past
encounters with objects and situations, but most importantly,
the effects (or outcomes) experienced in the past by selecting or
inhibiting those objects within speciﬁc situations. Explicitly, if
attentional selection of a certain object has led to positive conse-
quences in the past, the same object ought to more likely win
the attentional competition against alternative items when again
encountered in the future in similar contexts. The same could be
conceived of attentional suppression, assuming that if suppressing
a speciﬁc object has previously been advantageous, a tendency to
suppress the same object in the future may come about more read-
ily. In this review we will present and discuss the main ﬁndings
from a recent and quickly growing body of literature – coming in
part from our own laboratory – which offers a groundbreaking per-
spective on experience-dependent attentional ﬂexibility, suggest-
ing that it may be dramatically inﬂuenced (if not even primarily
controlled) by the delivery of rewards. However, before we address
the main subject of this review – namely, a collection of reward-
dependent attentional learning phenomena, we will present and
discuss recent work investigating a related, yet -we argue- clearly
distinct, type of inﬂuence exerted by reward on attentional deploy-
ment. It is well known that the prospect of reward can act as a form
of incentive motivation, which mobilizes cognitive resources for
the achievement of the reward at stake, including through the
more effective deployment of attention towards task-relevant in-
put (Aarts, Custers, & Marien, 2008; Pessoa, 2009; Shen & Chun,
2011). In the following section we will discuss this form of inﬂu-
ence of reward on attentional processing.2. Biased reward affecting attention through incentive
motivation
Rewards, including monetary ones, have been often used as
means to affect the motivational engagement of subjects taking
part in behavioral experiments (Pessoa, 2009; Pessoa & Engel-
mann, 2010; Sarter, Gehring, & Kozak, 2006; Watanabe, 2007).
Typically, subjects are informed prior to each trial that a certain
(monetary) outcome is at stake for responses that meet a predeter-
mined criterion on both speed and accuracy, so that there may be
the possibility to earn some money with successful responses, or
alternatively to lose money in case of poor responses. In all cases,
money therefore acts as an incentive for optimal performance, di-
rectly increasing subjects’ motivation and effort to deliver correct
and fast responses in order to achieve the desired outcomes. A re-
cent report further indicates that changes (increases) in the ex-
pected reward from one trial to the next are especially potent to
enhance cognitive ﬂexibility, as it can be measured with a number
of task paradigms, including task switching (Shen & Chun, 2011).
A number of studies have further demonstrated that the avail-
ability of reward, and especially differential reward in relation to
different spatial locations or objects, can exert a profound inﬂuence
on the deployment of attention. Speciﬁcally, evidence supports the
notion that the prospect of earning larger amounts of reward in
relation to a given location or visual item leads to preferential
deployment of attention towards the corresponding location or
item. It should be stated immediately that these effects of rewarddo not necessarily reﬂect explicit, or conscious processing,
although in general they do; nevertheless in our opinion they
invariably reﬂect changes in cognitive strategy in order to maxi-
mize the earning of reward during the course of the experiment.
A key feature of these studies is that effects of reward on attention
are measured while rewards are available and the participants are
likely doing their best to harvest as much as possible of the avail-
able reward.
In most cases the possible outcomes of each trial are signaled in
advance, so that the level of motivational engagement can be
manipulated prior to the presentation of the experimental stimuli,
and independently of their perceptual properties. Small et al. (2005)
were the ﬁrst to usemonetary incentives to investigatewhether the
attentional processing of a given visual stimulus could be affected
by subjects’ motivation, and they applied varying monetary incen-
tives for performance in a typical attentional orienting task, i.e. the
Posner task (Posner, 1980). Subjects were asked to maintain central
ﬁxation and a target stimulus was displayed either on the left or on
the right of the center. The task required the discrimination of the
shape of the target by delivering the appropriate behavioral re-
sponse. Before target onset, a cue was shown at ﬁxation, which
could either point to a possible target location, or be neutral. When
the cue was directional, trials could be valid, with targets appearing
at the cued position (80% of cases), or invalid, with targets appear-
ing on the opposite side (the remaining 20%). Since directional cues
are assumed to trigger attentional orienting, valid trials are usually
associated with marked performance beneﬁts due to the fact that
targets appear in a location already in the focus of attention, and in-
valid trials to signiﬁcant performance costs due to the fact that
attention must be reoriented towards the target in order to allow
its processing (Posner, 1980). In their study, Small and colleagues
showed that when monetary outcomes were at stake for optimal
performance, responses were signiﬁcantly faster, and that the ef-
fects of incentives were particularly evident in trials which entailed
attentional orienting towards a given region of space (i.e., valid and
invalid trials, with no signiﬁcant modulation of performance in
neutral trials). The neural correlates of these effects were found in
an incentive-dependent modulation of the overall activity in early
visual areas, as well as in areas involved in the orienting of visuo-
spatial attention, such as the posterior parietal cortex, including
the inferior parietal lobule. Moreover engagement of posterior cin-
gulate cortex was speciﬁcally related to the motivational aspect of
the task (Small et al., 2005).
In a subsequent study, the relationship between the subjects’
motivational state and attentional performance was investigated
by administering target stimuli that were either related or unre-
lated to food, and participants were tested while hungry or satiated
(Mohanty et al., 2008). The results showed that hungry subjects
oriented their attention more quickly towards food related stimuli,
in line with the fact that these items were more relevant given the
subjects’ current motivational state. This effect was found to corre-
late with activity in a number of brain regions, including portions
of the parietal cortex, such as the intraparietal sulcus, the amyg-
dala, the posterior cingulate cortex, the locus ceruleus and the sub-
stantia nigra. Interestingly, the activation levels in these regions
were selectively modulated by the motivational relevance of the
target stimuli: activity was increased in hungry subjects who were
orienting their attention towards food-related items, while it was
decreased both in hungry subjects orienting their attention to-
wards non-food items, and in satiated subjects orienting their
attention to food-related stimuli, whose motivational salience
was low (Mohanty et al., 2008).
Beneﬁcial effects of motivation on attentional performance
have also been reported in a series of studies by Engelmann and
Pessoa (Engelmann et al., 2009; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Pessoa
& Engelmann, 2010). These researches showed that the
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are directly linked to an increased perceptual sensitivity for the
critical stimuli. The neural mechanisms underlying this increased
sensitivity have been identiﬁed in motivation-induced changes in
activity in a distributed neuronal network, involving areas already
associated with attentional processing of sensory stimuli, including
the ventral precentral sulcus, the anterior insula, the caudate, and
the fusiform gyrus, in addition to nodes of the reward-processing
network (Engelmann et al., 2009).
By using a different approach, the effect of incentive motivation
on the detection of a given target stimulus has also been investi-
gated by Navalpakkam, Koch, and Perona (2009). They showed that
the performance beneﬁts associated to motivation might not only
derive from an improved perceptual/attentional stimulus process-
ing, but also from a response optimisation process that has the
effect of maximizing the possible behavioral outcomes (Navalpakkam,
Koch, & Perona, 2009). Evidence further indicates that the percep-
tual and the motivational relevance of visual objects can be inte-
grated at early stages of sensory input processing, giving rise to a
moment-to-moment complete representation of the expected
reward in each trial. Attentional resources have access to this
overall priority map and can be systematically oriented towards
the spatial locations that are associated to the maximum expected
reward in the current trial (Navalpakkam et al., 2010).
Another way of studying the effects of incentive motivation on
visual processing consists in the administration of experimental
tasks in which subjects are asked to choose between alternative
stimuli, which are ultimately associated to different outcomes.
Typically, the participants’ pattern of performance demonstrates
that they have learned the link between a stimulus and the associ-
ated reward probability by increasing the frequency with which
they prefer stimuli with more successful outcomes. Recent evi-
dence (Serences, 2008) has shown that this learned preference
for highly valued stimuli may have a neural correlate in brain areas
involved in the processing of visual input, indicating that the
learned value of a visual stimulus can directly inﬂuence its neural
representation throughout large portions of the visual cortex, at
both early and late stages of the hierarchy (see also Shuler & Bear,
2006). Modulations of activity related to stimulus value were
found in portions of retinotopically organized visual areas, includ-
ing V1, extrastriate visual cortex, intraparietal sulcus and frontal
eye ﬁelds, as well as in areas involved in the processing of both
attentional and motivational information, such as the inferior
and medial frontal gyri, left superior frontal sulcus, medial frontal
cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and inferior parietal lobe
(Serences, 2008). Further evidence obtained with fMRI has shown
that the incentive value associated with a given stimulus may also
affect and sharpen the activity of functional systems involved in
the processing of its critical features, such as for instance its orien-
tation, a type of modulation that may eventually lead to an im-
proved discrimination of the motivationally relevant stimuli with
respect to other, less valued items (Serences & Saproo, 2010; see
also Baldassi & Simoncini, 2011; for a related psychophysical
observation). Interestingly, in the work of Serences and Saproo
(2010) sharper tuning of neuronal representations in visual cortex
(notably V1) for valuable stimuli was found even when the valu-
able stimulus was not selected by the subject, and therefore was
presumably outside the focus of endogenous attention. However,
unlike what suggested by the authors, we do not take this to imply
that the reported effects are independent of attention; rather, we
would suggest that they likely reﬂect a form of attentional control
which depends on learning and acts regardless of strategic control
(see Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009).
Similar effects of reward biases acting as incentives which affect
the participants’ motivation to select speciﬁc visual stimuli have
been obtained within the context of pop-out search (Kiss, Driver,& Eimer, 2009). Here subjects were engaged in a simple visual
search task where on each trial they had to ﬁrst locate a color sin-
gleton target among distracting items, and secondly discriminate
its shape by delivering the appropriate motor response. Impor-
tantly, subjects were informed that targets in different colors
would be associated with different reward probabilities, so that
the incentive properties of the visual stimuli used were deﬁned a
priori and were entirely transparent to the participants (Kiss,
Driver, & Eimer, 2009; see also Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, &
Driver, 2010; for an extension of these ﬁndings to a condition
in which subjects were apparently never aware of the a priori
associations between target features and potential reward). Highly
valued targets led to marked beneﬁts in performance, and were
associated to an earlier and larger N2pc component in the corre-
sponding ERP signal, suggesting that their increased motivational
saliency was indeed accompanied by changes in neural activity
at relatively early stages of cortical visual processing (Kiss, Driver,
& Eimer, 2009).
In another brilliant study, the delivery of unbalanced rewards
has been introduced within the classical Stroop task (Krebs, Boeh-
ler, & Woldorff, 2010), in which the stimuli displayed are color-
words shown in colored print, such as the word YELLOW printed
in blue color. Subjects are required to name the print color of each
stimulus, and typically performance is slower and more error-
prone when the print color and the word meaning are conﬂicting
with respect to when they coincide (i.e. the word YELLOW written
in yellow color). In their study, Krebs and collaborators delivered
biased rewards in return for correct performance in the Stroop
task, so that some print colors were associated with monetary
incentives (and resulted in gains or losses, on the basis of actual re-
sponse parameters), while other print colors were not. The results
of this and a related study showed that the Stroop-like conﬂict can
be signiﬁcantly affected by the motivational relevance associated
to target and distracting information. In particular, performance
improved in trials where the motivationally signiﬁcant informa-
tion was task-relevant, while it was impaired when the same infor-
mation appeared as part of the distracter to be ignored (Krebs et al.,
2011; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). Using fMRI, the later
study observed that the prospect to obtain reward engaged the nu-
cleus accumbens – a region known to play a key role in reward pro-
cessing, together with dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex and the
inferior frontal gyrus on the right, and frontopolar cortex on both
sides – regions known to participate in executive control functions.
Furthermore, enhanced activity was found in the inferior parietal
cortex bilaterally, as well as in the fusiform gyrus. Overall, these re-
sults indicate that the prospect of earning money engages essen-
tially three component brain systems: the one involved in
processing reward, the one crucially responsible for exerting cogni-
tive control and maintaining task goals, and ﬁnally, portions of
extrastriate cortex that are responsible for processing the task-rel-
evant stimuli. The same study also explored the neural underpin-
nings of performance costs due to implicit, or accidental, reward
associations with the task-irrelevant dimension (word meaning),
whose inﬂuence on behavior cannot depend on strategic effects
of monetary incentives on attentional control. Here, in contrast, en-
hanced activity was found in lateral and medial frontal cortex,
including the pre-supplementary (pre-SMA) region, as well as in
the fusiform area bilaterally. It was proposed that the pre-SMA
activation may be speciﬁcally responsible for counteracting prepo-
tent response tendencies elicited by the reward-associated, yet
task-irrelevant, stimulus information. Finally, enhanced activity
within the fusiform gyrus was shared between task-relevant and
task-irrelevant stimulus-reward associations and was proposed
to mediate increased processing and attention (whether strategi-
cally deployed or reﬂexively engaged) for reward-associated input
in object-representation areas (Krebs et al., 2011).
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effects and neural underpinnings of motivationally driven inﬂu-
ences of reward prospect on attentional control. What we intend
to emphasize here is that rewards motivating individuals to deploy
attention in order to maximize success engage the same neuronal
mechanisms that are normally important for exerting cognitive
control. It has been argued before that, under conditions where re-
wards act as a form of incentive motivation to mobilize resources
for more efﬁcient control of attention, the effects of reward on
attention are hardly separable from those that can be elicited by
any other cue or instruction instigating attentional deployment
in a strategic fashion (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a; Maun-
sell, 2004; but see Krebs et al., 2011). To be more explicit, when-
ever individuals are presented with stimuli that predict different
amounts of reward, or different reward probabilities, it is obvious
that they will allocate attentional resources according to those dif-
ferences in a strategic fashion, owing to the diverse motivational
signiﬁcance of the competing stimuli. The motivational signiﬁ-
cance associated with each stimulus in a set can immediately
translate into more effort to deploy attention towards the stimulus
which predicts higher gains. These notions, which are conﬁrmed by
the results summarized in the foregoing paragraphs, are strongly
reminiscent of the principles captured by the well-known ‘‘match-
ing law’’. In simple terms, the matching law states that when
organisms are confronted with a choice situation, they allocate
their behavior to competing options in proportion to the distribu-
tion of reinforcers (Baum, 1974, 1979; Herrnstein, 1961; Sugrue,
Corrado, & Newsome, 2004, 2005). The notion can be easily trans-
ferred to the domain of attentional allocation, by simply assuming
that the attentional priorities of a number of competing stimuli
will reﬂect the differential in reward prediction associated with
the various stimuli (see Shahan & Podlesnik, 2006, 2007, for com-
patible ﬁndings in the pigeon). Unlike what we have discussed so
far, in the following sections we shall address forms of reward-
mediated attentional control that are not accounted for by the
notion that reward prediction mobilizes cognitive resources in a
purposive manner and instigates deployment of attention accord-
ingly in order to maximize beneﬁt. Instead, we will focus on forms
of reward-mediated effects on attention that crucially depend on
learning and memory.3. Effects of reward on the immediate deployment of visual
selective attention
The long standing research on the mechanisms and brain cir-
cuits underlying reward processing in general has shown that they
play a fundamental role in the monitoring of performance, by oper-
ating a continuous evaluation of the outcomes of behavior and of
their desirability (O’Doherty, 2004; Schultz, 2006; Schultz, 2007a,
2007b). During performance in typical paradigms used in psycho-
physical and cognitive psychology experiments, both the feedbacks
often provided to inform participants of their response accuracy or
the acknowledgment by the participant (in the absence of an exter-
nal feedback) that a correct response or an error has just been
made, evoke speciﬁc activations in brain structures that are also
sensitive to the delivery of reward, including portions of the cingu-
late cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997).
Moreover, when the tasks entail the win of variable amounts of re-
ward in return for correct performance, the same structures also
show differential activations for rewards of different entities, so
that lower rewards are usually associated with patterns of activa-
tion that are quite similar to those normally associated with error
feedbacks (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002). These results hint at
the possibility that even in standard conditions (i.e., in the absence
of explicit rewards), performance is continuously subject to aninternal evaluation of its efﬁcacy, which eventually leads to the
selective reinforcement and consolidation of patterns of neural
activity that led to the more advantageous behavior (Holroyd &
Coles, 2002).
In the studies carried out in our laboratory, considered below,
participants were engaged in attention demanding tasks, and while
error responses received a corresponding error signal, correct re-
sponses were followed by a reward feedback which signaled the
delivery of a variable monetary win. Importantly, highly and poorly
rewarded responses were equally correct from a formal point of
view, as the assignment of high and low rewards was always pre-
determined and unrelated to performance parameters (e.g., re-
wards were not related to response time). As it will be noted,
although the different studies report different effects of reward
on selective attention, they all reveal reward-dependent atten-
tional adjustments tending to increase the future probability of
obtaining more successful – and highly rewarding – outcomes.
Some years ago we pioneered the study of the relationship be-
tween reward and visual selective attention. In particular, in our
ﬁrst study we set out to investigate whether rewards had an im-
pact on the immediate aftereffects of attentional deployment
(Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). The experimental protocol allowed
us to investigate the inﬂuence of reward on two well known inter-
trial effects, such as positive (Rabbitt & Vyas, 1973; Tipper, 1985)
and negative priming (e.g., Tipper, 1985, 2001). Within this con-
text, positive priming consists of a marked facilitation in perfor-
mance, i.e. faster reaction times and lower error rates, in trials
where the current target has also served as the target in the previ-
ous trial, indicating that perceptual processing and attentional
selection of a given stimulus (as well as response selection) is facil-
itated over repeated encounters with the same stimulus. Symmet-
rically, as brieﬂy described above, negative priming refers to
deteriorated performance when the target stimulus in the current
trial matches the item that had served as the distracter to be ig-
nored in the previous trial. It is generally agreed that negative
priming arises from traces of lingering inhibition applied to a dis-
tracter’s internal representation, which perhaps in combination
with other perceptual and/or mnemonic mechanisms hampers
the selective processing of information that has previously been
actively suppressed (May, Kane, & Hasher, 1995; Neill & Valdes,
1992; Neill et al., 1992; Tipper, 2001; Tipper & Milliken, 1996).
Both these effects can be taken to indicate that any episode of
attentional processing leaves speciﬁc memory traces that outlive
the current episode and impact the ability to select and ignore spe-
ciﬁc items in the immediate future (also see Kristjánsson, 2006).
In our experiments, each correct response led to the gain of a re-
ward that could be high or low (10 or 1 Eurocents, respectively),
and participants were deceitfully told that this amount would be
determined by an algorithm on the basis of their performance. Spe-
ciﬁcally, incorrect responses would receive only an error feedback
and no reward, while correct responses would receive a high re-
ward when performance was deemed optimal, or a low reward
when it was deemed less than optimal (Fig. 1a). Contrary to this
instruction, reward values were selected independently from the
subject’s performance in the current trial, and could be high or
low with the same overall probability (50%). The key ﬁnding of
the study was that in conditions that normally lead to negative
priming effects (i.e., when the current target is identical to the pre-
vious distracter, relative to a control condition) robust negative
priming was found exclusively if response to the preceding trial
had led to high reward, and therefore performance was deemed
especially successful (Fig. 1b). In contrast, the attentional selec-
tions that, albeit correct, had been followed by a low reward
(and were therefore considered unsuccessful) not only failed to
give rise to negative priming, but in some cases even led to a par-
adoxical facilitation in responses – or a positive priming effect,
Fig. 1. Methods and results of Experiment 2 described in Della Libera and Chelazzi (2006). (a) Experimental paradigm: Two overlapping shapes, one red and one green,
appeared on the left of ﬁxation, while a black shape appeared on the opposite side. A green or red central square cued the relevant color in the sequence. Subjects had to
perform a same/different judgment between the shape in the relevant color on the left and the black one on the right. (b) Main results: The negative priming effect observed
in probe responses was signiﬁcantly modulated by the reward delivered following responses to the previous prime. In particular, the effect was only statistically reliable for
probes requiring a ‘same’ judgment and following highly rewarded primes. Error bars denote SEM.
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across consecutive trials in the absence of an inhibitory tag (Della
Libera & Chelazzi, 2006). Thus, the monetary feedback delivered
after each behavioral response appeared to play a key role in
strengthening the memory traces established by the attentional
suppression of distracting information during successful trials, or
in clearing up these traces whenever the attentional episode was
classiﬁed as unsuccessful. These results demonstrated for the ﬁrst
time that the memory trace left in place by each selection episode
can be modulated by a post-hoc appreciation of its adaptive value,
so that attentional selections with more desirable consequences,
including higher monetary gains, leave behind stronger and/or
longer-lasting traces compared to less rewarded selections.
Differently from what emerged relatively to the negative prim-
ing effect, the reward-dependent modulations of positive priming
seemed weaker and less consistent in this experiment (but see be-
low), suggesting that the facilitatory inter-trial effect that was
present in the data might reﬂect primarily the automatic conse-
quences of stimulus repetition, and be less sensitive to outcome-
based adjustments (Schacter & Buckner, 1998).
On the basis of the above observations, notably the absence of
any negative priming effect following low reward, it is actually
tempting to speculate that in standard experiments of this kind,
where reward is not typically involved, the occurrence of negative
priming may be dependent on some form of internal reward, acting
in a similar way to external reward feedback. In this vein, the
shared belief that negative priming tends to be a highly erratic
phenomenon under usual circumstances may be due to the vari-
able and ill-controlled impact of internal reward signals in most
experiments. Similar ideas can of course be put forward in relation
to different kinds of attentional learning phenomena, as previously
discussed, where learning is normally investigated in the absence
of any explicit reward, except sometimes for the delivery of feed-
back to inform the participants of their correct vs. wrong perfor-
mance. As we will see in later sections, we now know that long-
term attentional learning is also critically gated by reward.
Other studies have subsequently extended the above observa-
tions within the context of the additional distracter, visual search
paradigm (Theeuwes, 1992), showing that robust reward-based ef-
fects can also be obtained relatively to the attentional mechanisms
underlying target selection in these paradigms (Hickey, Chelazzi, &Theeuwes, 2010a, 2010b, 2011). Here participants performed vi-
sual search tasks in which the target, bearing a distinctive visual
feature, had to be ﬁrst detected among a number of nontarget
stimuli, and then categorized according to a task relevant stimulus
property. Importantly, on some trials, one of the nontargets was
rendered especially salient relative to the other nontargets, acting
as a singleton distracter (e.g., a green singleton item amongst an
array of red items). As shown in prior work, the salient distracter
impaired performance, owing to its ability to capture attention in
a reﬂexive manner. More importantly, when the color that distin-
guished the target from the salient singleton distracter remained
stable across consecutive trials, a signiﬁcant performance beneﬁt
was observed with respect to when it was changed, leading to
the well known facilitatory effect of inter-trial repetition priming
in this sort of task (Hickey et al., 2011; Maljkovic & Nakayama,
1994). However, such repetition beneﬁt was much stronger in
trials following highly rewarded responses with respect to trials
following poor rewards. This indicates that processing of reward-
associated features is facilitated, such that attention is deployed
to objects characterized by these features in subsequent trials
(see Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010; for a compatible
ﬁnding). One should note that also in these studies reward values
were completely decoupled from actual response parameters.
Nonetheless, low rewards, acting as a deceitful indicator of poor
performance, appeared to impede the establishment of strong
attentional aftereffects, even when the prior selection episode
had been perfectly adequate. Of crucial interest, the data also
showed that these effects of reward persisted even when strategic
deployment of attention acted in opposite direction, revealing a
form of enhanced and irresistible automatic capture of attention
by reward-associated features. The latter property – namely that
reward-associated features enjoy higher attentional priority even
in opposition to strategic attentional setting, is reminiscent of what
is known of the memory system that mediates priming of pop-out
and related phenomena (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2006). It is therefore
plausible that at least some of the inﬂuence exerted by reward
on inter-trial priming effects is mediated by the same memory
system.
More recent research (Hickey & van Zoest, 2012) has extended
these initial observations to overt oculomotor behavior, showing
that reward-associated features inﬂuence saccade trajectory even
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ignore them, with a detailed pattern of eye movements that is
highly similar to what previously observed with salience-based
manipulations (Godijn & Theeuwes, 2004).
Additional important observations emerged from the recent
work of Hickey and colleagues. One study demonstrated that re-
ward signals directly affect the perceptual salience of stimulus fea-
tures that have just been processed (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes,
2010a). Speciﬁcally, the analysis of scalp-recorded electroencepha-
lographic signals obtained from a group of participants revealed
that the event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded from posterior
recording sites in relation to the attentional selection of the target
stimuli (i.e., the P1 and N2pc) had a signiﬁcantly larger amplitude
in target feature-repetition trials following high rewards. This sug-
gested that the salience of target-deﬁning properties, which is nor-
mally enhanced when these properties are repeated across
consecutive trials, could be further boosted by an intervening
reward.
Interestingly, across individual participants, the extent to which
reward inﬂuenced stimulus salience and search performance was
highly correlated with the extent to which high vs. low reward
feedback itself elicited differential activity at the level of an ante-
rior and medial frontal region, including the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (ACC), a region which is commonly associated with the
processing of stimulus value and rewarding content (e.g., Gehring
& Willoughby, 2002). The higher the ACC sensitivity to the differ-
ent reward magnitudes, the largest the reward-dependent modula-
tion of performance for stimulus features that had been recently
associated with high vs. low rewards (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeu-
wes, 2010a). Moreover, and quite amazingly, the attentional sensi-
tivity to reward signals could be reliably predicted by speciﬁc
measures of personality traits that are commonly used to estimate
a subject’s reward sensitivity in the context of their daily activities
(Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b). Overall, based on the above
evidence, the authors proposed that rewards modulate activity
within the mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic system, including the
ACC, which then broadcasts signals towards posterior visual corti-
cal areas, directly modulating stimulus representations at this level
(Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a), a notion that ﬁnds direct
support in other work (Weil et al., 2010).4. Reward-dependent attentional learning
The evidence that highly rewarded attentional selections leave
stronger traces and exert a greater impact on the immediately sub-
sequent performance raises the obvious possibility that their inﬂu-
ence might also be longer lasting, so that the more successful
selections should have a higher probability of affecting behavior
in the long term. We investigated this possibility through a general
approach whereby participants underwent a training phase, fol-
lowed some days later by a test phase (Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009). During training, which consisted of three experimental ses-
sions on consecutive days, subjects were engaged in a task requir-
ing selective processing of task-relevant information and
concurrent suppression of distracting information (Fig. 2a). Correct
performance was immediately signaled by the delivery of reward,
which could be high or low. Crucially, and unknown to the sub-
jects, during training the reward values were systematically biased
depending on the speciﬁc stimuli displayed as target to be selected
or distracter to be ignored (Fig. 2c). When four out of the sixteen
total stimuli in the set were displayed, each correct response had
an 80% probability of leading to a high reward, and a 20% probabil-
ity of leading to a low reward. Four other items were instead asso-
ciated with a high reward in 20% of cases, and to a low reward in
the remaining 80%. Orthogonally to this classiﬁcation, for four ofthese stimuli (two for each probability level) the bias was applied
only to trials where they were the target to be selected, while for
the remaining four stimuli the bias was only applied when they
were the distracter to be ignored. Importantly, each of the stimuli
used in the experiment was displayed the same number of times as
target and distracter, therefore the perceptual and attentional
experience gained with all the items in the stimulus set was equal.
The experimental paradigm was designed so that the global prob-
ability of either reward value was 50%, and for each of the partic-
ipants different visual stimuli were assigned to the different
categories. It is important to underscore that, when queried at
the end of the experiments, none of the tested participants re-
ported any intuition of the reward schedule in relation to the dif-
ferent stimuli.
The effects of the unbalanced reward delivery applied during
the training phase were assessed in a separate experimental ses-
sion (test), which took place 5 days after training, and during
which no rewards were delivered. Participants were divided in
two groups, and tested by means of two different experimental
paradigms (Experiments 1 and 2 in Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009) which tapped distinct aspects of attentional processing
(Fig. 2b and d). In both cases subjects had to perform a task requir-
ing selection and ﬁltering of visual shapes, and the stimuli were the
same as those used during the training phase. In spite of the con-
siderable delay between training and test, we observed marked
differences in performance to stimuli falling in the different cate-
gories of reward bias (Fig. 3a and b). Across paradigms, which pro-
vided complementary results, items associated with higher
rewards when selected as targets during the training phase led
to facilitated responses when they were the target to be selected
in the test task. On the other hand, when the same stimuli were
presented as distracters at test, their suppression was harder, lead-
ing to slower and less efﬁcient behavioral performance. Symmetri-
cal results were obtained for stimuli that during training were
systematically associated with reward biases when playing the
role of distracters. If the test task required to ignore a stimulus that
previously (during training) led to higher gains when correctly ig-
nored, then performance was more efﬁcient, whereas it was more
difﬁcult to select the same stimuli if they were displayed as targets
in the test trials (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009). In other words, we
gathered evidence to indicate that reward delivery led to especially
robust attentional learning, which included both the increased efﬁ-
ciency of target selection and of distracter suppression.
There are several important observations to be made in relation
to the above ﬁndings. First and foremost, the observation that un-
der appropriate conditions we could detect an effect of our reward-
based manipulation in relation to the distracting item presented
during the test task is especially informative, as it indicates that
in our paradigm the inﬂuence of reward history on performance
was not mediated by any change in deliberate strategy. Of course
a change in strategy might be expected to affect performance, if
at all, in relation to the target item one is instructed to select,
not in relation to the distracter. Therefore, the demonstration that
a distracter that had been associated with high reward during
training (when playing the role of target) is harder to ignore com-
pared to a distracter that had been associated with low reward
during training (again, when playing the role of target) suggests
that the effect is due to the attentional priority acquired by the
item during training, and that such priority affects performance
regardless of strategy. Moreover, it is also highly unlikely that
our reward-based manipulation inﬂuenced performance through
an incentive motivation mechanism, of the type we have discussed
previously, since it is important to remember that no rewards were
involved during the test phase.
A second important point to make concerns the nature of the
underlying learning mechanism. As we will further elaborate
Fig. 2. Methods described in Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009). (a) Experimental paradigm adopted during the training sessions with reward in both Experiments 1 and 2:
Subjects performed a same/different judgment between the shape on the left shown in the previously cued color (red or green), and the black shape displayed on the right.
Each correct response was followed by a reward feedback indicating a high or low monetary win. (b) Experimental paradigm adopted in the test session of Experiment 1: The
task was identical to the one used during training, except that no reward was involved. (c) Sample sorting of stimulus shapes into biased reward categories for one example
subject. (d) Experimental paradigm adopted in the test session of Experiment 2: A sample shape was shown at the beginning of each trial. Then two shapes appeared brieﬂy,
one to the left and the other to the right of ﬁxation, and were immediately hidden by a pattern mask. Subjects had to decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether the
sample was present or absent in the stimulus array. Samples were present in 50% of cases.
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understood in terms of value learning, or the acquired value of
stimuli stemming from their consistent association with rewarding
events during training. If this were the case, then one would be led
to predict that stimuli consistently associated with high reward
when shown in the role of distracters during training, should either
remain unaffected or should have also become valuable items, and
therefore should be relatively easy to select and hard to ignore dur-
ing the test phase. But we obtained exactly the opposite pattern of
results. To reiterate, when the task at test measured the ability to
ignore a stimulus that previously (during training) led to higher
gains when correctly ignored, we found that ﬁltering of such dis-
tracter was more efﬁcient, whereas it was more difﬁcult to select
these stimuli if they were displayed as targets in the test trials.
Therefore, it appears that the association with high reward during
training enhanced the ability to select stimuli presented as targets
as well as the ability to ignore stimuli presented as distracters.
Again, this is unlike what one might expect as the consequences
of value learning, whereby items imbued with higher value should
have higher attentional priority and should therefore be easier to
select and harder to ignore.
A ﬁnal important notion which can be derived from the above
study concerns the degree to which the effects of our reward-based
manipulation require that the task be the same between training
and test, or whether instead they can generalize across different
tasks. Evidence obtained in one of the tested groups (Experiment
2 in Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009) clearly indicates that effects
generalize easily to a different task from that used during training.
This strengthens the notion that such effects do not reﬂect the lin-
gering consequences of a deliberate strategy developed duringtraining in relation to the various stimuli within the context of a
given task, because if that were the case then one would expect
that no effect should be found when the task changes between
training and test, but this was not the case. Therefore, we can con-
clude that the reported effects depend on attentional learning phe-
nomena occurring in relation to the speciﬁc stimuli shown during
training, and the effects are bound to the speciﬁc stimuli but are
independent from the given task.
A growing literature from recent years provides converging evi-
dence to support the notion that rewards exert an especially strong
inﬂuence on attention and attentional learning. In the study by
Raymond and O’Brien (2009) subjects were initially involved in a
value learning protocol, in which they (implicitly) learned that dif-
ferent visual stimuli (in this case human faces) had a different
probability of leading to more or less positive outcomes. Subse-
quently, the same stimuli appeared in a rapid visual serial presen-
tation (RSVP) task where subjects had to discriminate the shape of
a simple geometrical ﬁgure, and then to categorize a subsequently
presented face stimulus as old or new with respect to the faces
seen in the previous phase of the experiment. It is well established
that, in RSVP paradigms, when the time lag between the two tar-
gets is within a critical range (typically between 100 and 500 ms)
a signiﬁcant decrement in performance is observed in relation to
the second target, provided that the ﬁrst is correctly identiﬁed –
an effect termed ‘‘attentional blink’’ (e.g., Dux & Marois, 2009;
Olivers & Meeter, 2008; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). Inter-
estingly, it was found that when highly rewarded faces were used
as the second target, these were more likely to be correctly identi-
ﬁed with respect to less rewarded items, therefore showing a
marked resistance of valuable items to the attentional blink effect
Fig. 3. Long term effects of reward. (a) Results from Experiment 1 in Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009). (b) Results from Experiment 2 in Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009). (c)
Results described in Della Libera, Perlato, and Chelazzi (2011). In all panels the effects associated with the current target item are depicted on the left, while those associated
with the current distracter are depicted on the right. Error bars denote SEM for the data presented in each panel.
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shown that value association of stimuli affects not only thedeployment of attention in the time domain, as the effect on the
attentional blink suggests, but also in the spatial domain
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were used as uninformative cues in a typical probe task, responses
were slower for probes appearing in positions previously occupied
by highly valued stimuli. Assuming that attention is automatically
captured by the initial appearance of highly rewarded objects, the
subsequent presentation of a task relevant item (the probe) in the
same spatial position might have led to the typical cost in perfor-
mance associated with inhibition of return (e.g., Klein, 2000), sug-
gesting that the reward-related stimuli are capable of strong
capture of visuo-spatial attention.
A direct test that stimuli imbued with value, as a result of stim-
ulus-reward associations established during a training phase, can
exert attentional capture – termed value-driven attentional cap-
ture – has been performed by Anderson and colleagues with a ser-
ies of experiments using variants of the visual search task
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2011b). Similarly to the proce-
dure that we have adopted in our study (Della Libera & Chelazzi,
2009), here again subjects completed a training and a test session,
although unlike what we did in our work, here both sessions took
place on the same day. Rewards were delivered only during train-
ing and the probability of receiving a high or low reward was
biased according to the speciﬁc target-deﬁning color. During train-
ing participants were to search for a color deﬁned target presented
amongst an array of colored nontargets. Target color was constant
and deﬁned in advance, and it could be either red or green with
equal probability, with one color associated with high reward on
most trials, ant the other color associated with low reward on most
trials (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2011b). During the test
session, which took place immediately after training, colors were
never task relevant, and subjects had to ﬁnd a uniquely shaped tar-
get, to then discriminate the orientation of a line segment that ap-
peared inside it. In one study (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011b),
on half the trials all the stimuli were displayed in black against a
white background, while on the other half one of the nontargets
was made more salient and shown in one of the colors that during
training was associated with high or low rewards. The presence of
a salient distracter during the test strongly hampered task perfor-
mance, as previously shown (Theeuwes, 1992); however, this ef-
fect was magniﬁed when the salient distracter was shown in the
color linked to higher rewards during training, indicating that
highly rewarded target features engendered especially strong and
involuntary capture of attention (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis,
2011b). Interestingly, in a previous study (Anderson, Laurent, &
Yantis, 2011a) it was shown that capture can be induced by a valu-
able distracter even when this is not an intrinsically salient ele-
ment, thus for the only reason that value has enhanced its
salience relative to that of the other nontargets.
In summary, the above studies provide converging evidence
that reward delivery affects attentional priority through forms of
learning, which leads to substantial changes in performance
depending on the reward history associated with speciﬁc stimuli.
Importantly, as we noted earlier, while some ﬁndings lend them-
selves to a relatively simple interpretation in terms of value learn-
ing (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a, 2011b; Raymond &
O’Brien, 2009), others require more articulated explanations, pre-
sumably calling into play different forms of learning and a more
speciﬁc learning-mediated inﬂuence on selection and suppression
mechanisms (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009), as discussed in the fol-
lowing section.5. Underlying mechanisms of reward-based attentional
plasticity
The controlled delivery of reward has become an elective meth-
od to unveil how our neuro-cognitive systems can ﬂexibly adjust inorder to increase ﬁtness with the environment and its unfolding
transformations. The literature on reward-dependent modiﬁca-
tions of overt behavior plays a fundamental role within psychology
and behavioral sciences in general. Starting at the beginning of the
twentieth century, with Thorndike’s formulation of the Law of Ef-
fect (Thorndike, 1911), the evidence that reinforced behaviors tend
to be more easily incorporated in the repertoire of the individual
and more frequently reinstated has paved the way to the develop-
ment of the well known learning theories based on operant condi-
tioning (Skinner, 1938, 1953, 1981). On the other hand, the natural
sensitivity to reward signals can determine signiﬁcant changes in
behavior even when reward delivery bears no relationship with a
speciﬁc behavioral pattern, but happens to be temporally contigu-
ous to the perceptual processing of a given sensory event. Hence,
stimuli whose processing has been systematically followed by a
reward may become favorite over other competing objects
(Pessiglione et al., 2008), can be more easily discriminated (Seitz,
Kim, & Watanabe, 2009), and are more vigorously represented in
cortical visual processing areas (Frankó, Seitz, & Vogels, 2010).
Interestingly, these effects occur even when reward signals are dis-
played below the threshold of perceptual awareness (Pessiglione
et al., 2008), and in tasks that require a minimal or null deploy-
ment of attentional resources towards the given perceptual stimuli
(Frankó, Seitz, & Vogels, 2010; Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009). The
latter evidence is in line with the phenomenon of evaluative con-
ditioning, which consists in a change in the valence of a stimulus
(initially neutral) resulting from its pairing with another stimulus
(that usually has a speciﬁc emotional valence) (De Houwer,
Baeyens, & Field, 2005; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Just
like other types of Pavlovian associative learning (Hall, 1994), this
type of reward-based learning involves the mere association
between a given sensory input and the more or less pleasurable
events that accompany it. In conclusion, it is likely that the atten-
tional processing of visual stimuli be shaped by reward signals
both in conditions where the implementation of an efﬁcient behav-
ioral response is instrumental for the obtainment of the given
reward (as in operant conditioning), and in conditions where
rewards are garnered fortuitously, and irrespectively of behavior
(as in Pavlovian conditioning).
Previous research has pointed out that associative learning in
humans can be inﬂuenced both by the type of instructions received
by participants upon entering an experiment, as well as by their
beliefs and hypotheses on the relationship between their perfor-
mance and the resulting outcome (Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden,
1984; Rosenfarb et al., 1992). Therefore, an aspect that should
not be overlooked when studying reward-based manipulations in
human participants is the type of instructions conveyed to the par-
ticipants at the start of any experiment as well as the type of infor-
mation conveyed by reward signals obtained during the course of
the experiment. In the studies reviewed in previous sections,
exploring reward-based effects on visual selective attention, the
information given to the participants about the criteria underlying
reward delivery was quite variable. In some cases rewards were
delivered within a passive viewing task that did not require any
behavioral responses (Seitz, Kim, & Watanabe, 2009); therefore
the coupling between rewards and visual stimuli only occurred
on the basis of temporal contiguity between the two. In others in-
stead rewards were delivered in turn for a correct response within
the context of the given task, and thus the association between re-
wards and stimuli implied an instrumental type of associative
learning. Still, among these latter cases, the relationship between
reward values and perceptual stimuli could be completely trans-
parent, so that subjects were fully debriefed that correct responses
to some stimuli would yield higher rewards (Kiss, Driver, & Eimer,
2009; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010; Krebs et al., 2011;
Pessiglione et al., 2008; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Rutherford,
Fig. 4. Conceptual representation of the different mechanisms through which reward can affect attentional deployment. (a) Rewards as incentives for motivation. The
prospect of earning reward in return for optimal performance triggers cognitive effort and the deployment of top-down attention towards stimuli with a higher motivational
salience. Attention then impacts on perceptual processes (which in turn inﬂuence attention in bottom-up), allowing enhanced representation of valuable input; the selected
input is the target of behavioral performance. Behavior is guided towards the achievement of reward. (b) Rewards as accidental events, leading to forms of Pavlovian
conditioning: The rewarding signal is passively associated with the perceptual representation of the current input stimuli, which leads to their enhanced representation (to
note that perception and attention entertain a two-way interaction, as in panel a); the selected input representation has privileged access to behavioral control. Lack of a link
between behavior and reward is meant to highlight that here reward is not acting as a motivational drive of behavior. (c) Rewards as feedbacks on performance: When
rewards are perceived to depend on one’s own performance, the information carried by reward signals is integrated with an internal evaluation of performance, and impacts
on speciﬁc attentional processes applied to the perceptual representation of stimuli. Rewarding feedbacks thus affect stimulus salience through a selective modulation
process, in which reward values are associated with the speciﬁc operations (selection or inhibition) that instrumentally led to them, impacting behavior accordingly.
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led to believe that rewards would depend on their performance,
so that the monetary gains were not only viewed as events with
a certain rewarding value, but also conveyed feedback information
on performance (e.g., Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009).
Given that these different types of reward-based associative
learning may be mediated by partially independent systems (Bjork
& Hommer, 2007; Hakyemez et al., 2008; Tricomi, Delgado, & Fiez,
2004), understanding whether they can exert similar or different
modulations of visual selective attention seems a crucial issue, in
order to unveil the mechanisms underlying these effects. In a re-
cent study we have speciﬁcally addressed this problem. We repli-
cated one of our original experiments on long term effects of
rewards (Experiment 1 in Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009), but this
time we informed subjects that the monetary wins following each
correct response would be determined on a random, lottery-like
basis (Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011). As in the previous
experiment, subjects took part in three training sessions with
biased reward delivery, and in a test session 5 days later. The re-
sults were strikingly different from those previously gathered with
the very same experimental paradigm but from a group of subjects
who believed to earn their rewards on the basis of their perfor-
mance level. In this new group, responses in the test task were so-
lely affected by the overall reward bias associated to the given
visual stimuli, so that in comparison to the less rewarded ones,
items that had been more frequently followed by high rewards
were more difﬁcult to ﬁlter out when they were the distracters
in the current trial, and this happened irrespectively of the role
(target or distracter) that they played when the reward manipula-
tion was applied during training (Fig. 3c).
The picture emerging by considering this result and those dis-
cussed in the previous sections indicates that, just as it happens
for learning of overt behavior, reward-based attentional learning
may follow different routes depending on the perceived link be-
tween performance and outcome. When performance is consid-
ered determinant for the achievement of rewards, then plasticity
is observed at the level of the speciﬁc processes that enabled it
(i.e., target selection and distracter inhibition), and learning takes
the form of an instrumental type of adaptation (Della Libera &
Chelazzi, 2009). Differently, when rewards are viewed as random,
fortuitous events, then a direct and passive association takes place
between the perceived stimuli and the rewards that follow them
(Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011).According to the notion of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer
(Lovibond, 1983), instrumental learning emerges following two
consecutive phases: initially, a perceptual stimulus is associated
with a contiguous reward in a Pavlovian fashion. Subsequently,
subjects learn to act in response to this stimulus in order to evoke
the associated reward. If this were also the case for the sort of
attentional learning that we have induced, then we might conjec-
ture that when rewards are viewed as unrelated to performance
only the ﬁrst – automatic – association is formed, and only the
overall contingencies between stimulus representations and re-
wards will be learned (Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011). If in-
stead rewards are thought to depend on performance, then the
process develops completely and learning modulates not just a
generic stimulus representation, but speciﬁcally the attentional
weighing (or prioritisation) process acting on this representation
(i.e., selected as a target or inhibited as a distracter) (Della Libera
& Chelazzi, 2009).
Interestingly, Dickinson, Shanks, and Evenden (1984) demon-
strated that when participants are initially exposed to an experi-
mental context in which outcomes are determined by external
causes, they fail to acquire instrumental learning when outcomes
are later rendered contingent on their own performance. We might
speculate that in our recent study (Della Libera, Perlato, & Chelazzi,
2011) the explicit instruction that rewards were randomly deliv-
ered similarly blocked (Kamin, 1969; Kruschke & Blair, 2000)
instrumental learning for the behaviorally relevant contingencies.
Recent research suggests that both types of reward-based
attentional learning involve brain structures usually associated
with attentional control, including posterior parietal cortex (Krebs
et al., 2011; Peck et al., 2009), and the processing of rewarding
information, including the striatum and the anterior cingulate cor-
tex (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a; O’Doherty, 2004;
Schultz, 2006; Weil et al., 2010). Moreover, and perhaps most
interestingly, they can affect the neural representation of visual
stimuli at the level of extrastriate visual cortex, including area V4
and the inferotemporal cortex (Frankó, Seitz, & Vogels, 2010;
Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a; Jagadeesh et al., 2001;
Mogami & Tanaka, 2006; Pessiglione et al., 2008; Weil et al.,
2010), and this can occur even outside the context of a task as
the result of the shear association of a stimulus with reward
(Frankó, Seitz, & Vogels, 2010). Furthermore, recent evidence sug-
gests that speciﬁc subcortical structures, such as portions of the
striatum (Bjork & Hommer, 2007; Hakyemez et al., 2008; Tricomi,
L. Chelazzi et al. / Vision Research 85 (2013) 58–72 69Delgado, & Fiez, 2004), might be crucially recruited only when re-
wards are perceived to depend on performance, giving rise to ac-
tion-dependent instrumental learning. It would then be
particularly interesting to explore whether training with different
types of attentional learning protocols – including those where re-
wards are viewed as a form of feedback on performance and those
where they are viewed as random events, recruits speciﬁc and dis-
sociable patterns of brain activity, both at the cortical and subcor-
tical level, highlighting the contribution of speciﬁc brain structures
to distinct forms of reward-mediated attentional learning.6. Reward-based attentional plasticity and its side-effects
The sensitivity of attentional mechanisms to reward-related
signals has recently been recognized as one of the core factors
underlying the development and the maintenance of dysfunctional
behaviors observed in a number of psycho-pathological conditions.
Such sensitivity is attested to by marked biases of attention to-
wards certain items, or categories of items. One of these conditions
is represented by the various forms of addiction, which develop
after an initial exposure to a substance (e.g., cocaine, heroine, nic-
otine) or an activity (e.g., gambling, sex, video games) with imme-
diately rewarding effects, and subsequently evolve as a strong and
compulsive drive to obtain more reward, despite any negative con-
sequences and at the expense of most other activities (Feltenstein
& See, 2008; Wise, 1980). Abnormal biases of attention towards
critical visual stimuli have also been uncovered in a variety of
other clinical conditions, including eating disorders (Davis, 2010),
forms of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), phobias (Mogg & Bradley,
2006), and obsessive-compulsive disorders (Dobson & Dozois,
2004). As evidenced in a number of studies, addicted individuals
show a strong and automatic tendency to focus attentional re-
sources onto addiction-related objects when they are available in
the visual environment (for a recent review, see Field & Cox,
2008). According to one inﬂuential theory, the Incentive Sensitisat-
ion Theory of addiction (Robinson & Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2008),
these biases are determined by an exaggerate increase in the sal-
ience of certain classes of stimuli, in turn generated by the re-
peated association between the perceptual/attentional processing
of these items and the enactment of rewarding (and addicting)
behaviors. As this theory proposes, addiction may induce plastic
changes in brain circuits and mechanisms mediating the incentive
salience of visual stimuli, so that their mere exposure may evoke in
addicts strong craving and drive to re-enact their addictive habits.
From a clinical point of view these biases represent one of the ma-
jor obstacles to a full recovery from addiction, because they seem
quite resistant to treatment and may cause relapse even in former
addicts (Field & Cox, 2008). From our point of view, however, they
are especially interesting because it is likely that they are gener-
ated through the same mechanisms that are tapped by the sort
of reward-based manipulation that we and others have applied
to study the inﬂuence of reward on attention and attentional
learning in normal individuals. Therefore, we believe that the
understanding of the neuro-cognitive mechanisms underlying
reward-dependent attentional learning in normal individuals will
ultimately prove of crucial importance also for the understanding
of pathological biases of attention in speciﬁc groups of individuals,
including but not limited to addicts.7. Conclusions
To sum up, the studies on attentional processing of stimuli asso-
ciated with biased rewards reveal that when highly rewarded
stimuli are task relevant they may lead to faster and more accurate
performance in visual search tasks (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009;Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010), and in the Stroop
task (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010; Krebs et al., 2011); they
also engender stronger inter-trial priming effects (Hickey, Chelazzi,
& Theeuwes, 2010a; Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver, 2010)
and a higher resistance to the attentional blink phenomenon (Ray-
mond & O’Brien, 2009). When the same stimuli act as distracters
that need to be ignored they often lead to stronger effects of invol-
untary attentional capture (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011a,
2011b; Rutherford, O’Brien, & Raymond, 2010) and greater inter-
ference effects (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Krebs, Boehler, &
Woldorff, 2010; Krebs et al., 2011). However, it should be recalled
that while some of the above results could all be reconciled with
the notion of value learning, and the ensuing inﬂuence on atten-
tional priority, some other results require a different explanation,
namely one where rewards cannot only increase the salience of
certain visual stimuli, thus facilitating their selection, but also in-
crease the efﬁciency with which other stimuli can be suppressed.
We have proposed that the latter effects can only be accounted
for by making reference to notions of instrumental conditioning,
whereby the delivery of rewards in relation to the suppression of
a certain stimulus will reinforce the tendency for attention mech-
anisms to suppress the same stimulus on future occasions, not
unlike the inﬂuence of instrumental conditioning on motor
performance.
We have also seen that attentional learning can occur through
at least two distinct mechanisms, one involving active monitoring
of performance and outcome (Fig. 4c), and a second one detecting
the sheer association between objects in the environment
(whether attended or ignored) and the more-or-less rewarding
events that accompany them (Fig. 4b). In turn, these learning ef-
fects should not be confounded with effects obtained when the
prospect of reward acts as a motivational drive to increase cogni-
tive effort in relation to certain stimuli or locations (Fig. 4a).
In this article we have emphasized the importance of distin-
guishing among the different ways in which reward will inﬂuence
attentional deployment and learning, depending on various char-
acteristics of the given paradigm. However, it must be also recog-
nized that in some of the studies reported so far the different
mechanisms are often compounded, and the relative contribution
of each individual mechanism is therefore hard to determine. For
example, in studies (e.g., Kiss, Driver, & Eimer, 2009; Krebs,
Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010; Kristjánsson, Sigurjónsdóttir, & Driver,
2010) where reward is primarily acting as a form incentive motiva-
tion, presumably driving attention in a deliberate, strategic manner
(see Fig. 4a), it is very likely that learning mechanisms are also en-
gaged during the course of the experiment (see Fig. 4b and c), with
the overall pattern of reward-mediated effect at the performance
level reﬂecting a combination of both mechanisms. Speciﬁcally,
in the work of Krebs, Boehler, and Woldorff (2010) and Krebs
et al. (2011), it is likely that rewards mainly acted through en-
hanced motivation in relation to task-relevant information, while
their effect in relation to task-irrelevant information was presum-
ably mediated by learning (see also Serences, 2008). However, even
the effect obtained in relation to the task-relevant information was
partly aided by learning-dependent mechanisms, as indicated by
data obtained under the extinction regime (Krebs, Boehler, &
Woldorff, 2010, Experiment 2), when rewards were no longer
delivered.
Given the role of selective attention in guiding behavior, and gi-
ven that behavior itself has long been known to be largely inﬂu-
enced by the delivery of rewards, it might seem logical to predict
that selective attention is also sensitive to rewards. However, no
research had ever been conducted to explore this possibility until
a few years ago. Now a rapidly growing body of literature is report-
ing fascinating discoveries in this realm, enabling a rapid progress
in our understanding of the different ways in which rewards shape
70 L. Chelazzi et al. / Vision Research 85 (2013) 58–72the ongoing deployment of attention and, especially, attentional
learning phenomena affecting processing in the long term. Inter-
estingly, as we alluded to earlier, it could be argued that every epi-
sode of attentional selection might be subject to some kind of
internal efﬁciency check process, which may induce continuous
adjustments of attentional deployment with the aim of maximiz-
ing ﬁtness to the given context. In the absence of explicit, external
feedback on performance, such as the rewarding feedbacks intro-
duced ad-hoc in some of the studies reviewed here, neural signals
underlying attentional selections that are internally recognized as
being successful might be accordingly strengthened, giving rise to
the standard attentional inter-trial effects and longer lasting atten-
tional learning effects, as we know them.
In conclusion, it may seem rather paradoxical that learning
principles once developed to explain overt behavior within a theo-
retical framework that was skeptical about the hidden and impal-
pable intricacies of cognition now appear to be perfectly suited to
account for reward-based changes in attentional priority in the
short and in the long term. It takes very little imagination to sus-
pect that analogous effects of reward-mediated learning might im-
pact all kinds of other cognitive activities.
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